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SECURITIZATION
 . 
Preface and Afterword by L. Randall Wray
Preface
Over the past year, many analysts have invoked the name of Hyman P. Minsky in attempts to
understand the nature of the current financial crisis. Several studies have used Minsky’s well-
known financial instability hypothesis to explain how a fragile financial structure was created over
the course of the U.S. real estate boom, which ultimately led to rising defaults and the collapse of
the subprime securities market when Ponzi units could no longer service their mortgages. I have
gone further, showing how Minsky’s writings can help us to understand the longer-term forces at
workthathaveresultedinaparticularlyunstableformof capitalism—whatMinskycalled“money
manager capitalism” (Wray 2008). Hence, I believe that Minsky would argue that what we face is
a systemic problem that goes far beyond subprimes and real estate, one that will require major
institutional reform to re-create a financial system that is conducive, in Minsky’s phrase, to “the
capital development of the economy.”
Minsky died in October 1996,at the beginning of the dot-com boom,which was soon followed
by the real estate boom, followed in turn by a commodities boom. All three of these speculative
excesses required finance, and each was fueled by innovative instruments and practices. The dot-
com boom relied largely on the new-issue market,in which stocks were sold for start-up companies
with no history on which to base the values of the firms. Standards were gradually lowered until
firms with no prospective revenues but high costs could float equities at astronomical prices.
Leveraged buyouts allowed management and the owners of upstarts like AOL to cash out as they2 Policy Note, 2008 / 2
took over profitable,venerable firms like Time Warner.When that
euphoria finally came to an ignoble end, managed money moved
into real estate. Here, the preferred financial instrument was the
securitized mortgage product,essential for the“originate and dis-
tribute” model that could ignore risk while unserviceable debt
drove the biggest real estate boom in U.S. history. But securities
were not limited to the real estate market—everything from stu-
dent loans to credit card receivables to auto finance was securi-
tized and bought by highly leveraged pension funds and hedge
funds.Evenasthatbegantounwind,managedmoneymovedinto
commodities,usingfuturesmarketstofuelanotherrecordrun-up
of prices—this time, prices of food and energy. Analysts are just
now beginning to turn their focus to those excesses.
It was Minsky’s belief that managed money capitalism raises
important questions about stability, equity, and democracy. He
worried that the longer-term transformation of the financial sys-
tem away from regulated financial institutions (dominated by
commercial and investment banks as well as thrifts and credit
unions) and toward largely unregulated financial markets would
reduce oversight both by the skeptical loan officers at banks and
by government supervisors at the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, and state regulatory agencies. Instead, managed
money would rely on hired for-profits such as credit-rating
agencies and accounting firms to check the natural tendency for
declining credit standards in a boom.Clearly,these were not up
to the task, since they would share in the euphoric expectations
characteristic of expansions; they essentially became cheerlead-
ers for dangerous practices. Further, since depressions and debt
deflations have been eliminated by Big Bank (Fed) and Big
Government (Treasury) interventions,downside risks would be
ignored. Over the past few years, this has been recognized even
by mainstream economists and policymakers, who refer to the
“Greenspan put” or to “Bernanke’s ‘great moderation’”—the
endemic belief within financial markets that policymakers will
never let anything bad happen.
Minsky added that this transformation of the financial
structure of the economy also produced growing inequality and
rising insecurity for most Americans—conditions antithetical
to democracy (Minsky and Whalen 1996).Hence,he advocated
anumberof policiesthatwouldreduceuncertaintywhileenhanc-
ing stability and democracy: support for strong trade unions;
tax incentives to lead firms to offer family-friendly benefits;
universal provision of high-level health care and education; full
employment policies,including government job creation; higher
andmoreeffectiveminimumwages;anexpandedEarnedIncome
Tax Credit and adequate child allowances; portable pensions;
institutional constraints on, and regulation of, money man-
agers; and a network of small, local community-development
banks (Papadimitriou and Wray 1998).
While Minsky died too soon to observe the explosion in the
securitization of home mortgages, he did write a prescient piece
on the nature, and the implications, of securitization. This was
published as a memo in 1987,and served as the basis of a lecture
in his monetary theory class at Washington University as well as
the foundation for informal discussion. Although I have made
use of it in my own work, the memo has not been widely circu-
lated.A number of researchers have requested copies,and so The
Levy Economics Institute decided to publish the piece as a policy
note. I have done some light editing of the original to eliminate
obvious errors. I have also added a few explanatory words here
and there in square brackets.Otherwise,what follows is Minsky’s
original memo, in its entirety. It can be read in conjunction with
my latest policy brief (Wray 2008) and with Senior Scholar Jan
Kregel’srecentpublications(2008a;2008b)toseehowsecuritiza-
tion helped to create the current financial crisis.
Securitization
Hyman P. Minsky, Washington University, St. Louis
Notespreparedfordiscussion,June27,1987;editedandexpanded
August 1987,corrected September 1987
Heraclites: “You can not step twice in the same river.”
At the annual banking structure and competition conference
oftheFederalReserveBankofChicagoinMay1987,thebuzz-
word heard in the corridors and used by many of the speakers
was“that which can be securitized, will be securitized.”
Introduction
Itisnecessarytounderstandwhatsecuritizationinvolvesandhow
it might affect the development of the world economy if central
bank interventions and the government interventions that guide
institutionaldevelopmentsaretobesuccessful.Securitizationleads
to the creation of financial paper that is eminently suitable for a
global financial structure. There is a symbiotic relation betweenThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 3
the globalization of the world’s financial structure and the secu-
ritization of financial instruments. Globalization requires the
conformity of institutions across national lines and in particu-
lar the ability of creditors to capture assets that underlie the
securities.
Securitization reflects a change in the weight of market and
bank funding capabilities: market funding capabilities have incre-
ased relative to the funding abilities of banks and depository
financial intermediaries. It is in part a lagged response to mone-
tarism.Thefightingof inflationbyconstrainingmonetarygrowth
opened opportunities for nonbanking financing techniques.The
monetarist way of fighting inflation, which preceded the 1979
“practicalmonetarism”of [then–FederalReserveChairmanPaul]
Volcker,puts banks at a competitive disadvantage in terms of the
short-term growth of their ability to fund assets. Furthermore,
by opening interest rate wedges, monetary constraint provides
profit opportunities for innovative financing techniques.
The interest rates of the monetarist experiment destroyed
the funding capabilities of the thrift “industry” in the United
States by undermining the value of mortgages and thus impair-
ing their net worth.The ability of the thrifts to create mortgages
was unimpaired even as their ability to fund holdings was
greatly impaired. Securitization as we know it began in the U.S.
mortgage market. It enabled the thrifts to continue to initiate
mortgages even though their funding ability was sorely compro-
mised. Although modern securitization may have begun with
the thrifts, it has now expanded well beyond the thrifts and
mortgage loans.
Securitizationalsoisaresponsetothecoststructureof banks.
Banks seem to need a 450-basis-point margin if fund income is
to be the source of profits. This provides a great deal of profit
space for innovative suppliers with lower costs. Bank participa-
tion in securitization is part of the drive, forced by costs, to
supplement fund income with fee income. The development of
the money market funds, the continued growth of mutual and
pension funds, and the emergence of the vast institutional hold-
ings by offshore entities provide a market for the instruments
created by securitization.
Any attempt to place securitization in context needs to start
with early-19th-century commercial bill banking in Britain and
the recognition that accepting contingent liabilities is a funda-
mentalbankingact.Themoderncontributionisthedevelopment
of techniques to“enhance credits” without accepting contingent
liabilities or the investment of pure equity funds.Securitization
throws light on the nature of money: money is a financial instru-
ment(adebt)thatdevelopsoutofthefinancingofactivityandposi-
tions in assets and becomes generally accepted in an economic com-
munity as a means of payment for goods and services and as an
instrument by which debts are discharged. It is conceivable that in
the not too distant future we could be using $100 interest-bear-
ing short-term securities as currency. Private money is a distinct
possible future outcome of current developments.
Securitization implies that there is no limit to bank initia-
tive in creating credits for there is no recourse to bank capital,
and because the credits do not absorb high-powered money
[bank reserves]. Both capital and reserve absorption may occur
at the initiating stage of the credit [before the securities can be
created and sold]. This has led to the terminology of “bridge
financing.”[But once the securities are moved off the bank bal-
ance sheet, neither capital nor reserves is leveraged any longer.]
Securitization lowers the weight of that part of the financing
structure that the central bank (Federal Reserve in the United
States) is committed to protect. A need by holders of securities
who are committed to protect the market value of their assets
(such as mutual or money market funds,or trustees for pension
funds) may mean that a rise in interest rates will lead to a need
by holders to make position by selling position, which can lead
to a drastic fall in the price of the securities.
Securitization and globalization reflect the new technology
of communication, computation, and record keeping.
The two fundamental banking interfaces
There are two fundamental banking interfaces: the relation
between the bank and its debtors, and the relation between the
bankanditsfunders.Inwhatfollows,theterm“bank”isageneric
term not restricted to legally defined banks.
1.“Bank” and debtors
The initial creation of paper is based on cash flows from income-
creating activities [or from the sale of assets—preferably, assets
that have appreciated in value]. In each case, the liability created
and held by the bank commits future income.If the liability is of
business,it is a prior allocation of profits; if it is of households,it
represents a prior allocation of wages,etc.; if it is of government,
it is a prior allocation of taxes; and if it is a liability of the rest of
the world,it is a prior allocation of export earnings.Note that in
every case, such paper links the present and the future. Today is
the future for some past todays. Prior commitments are falling4 Policy Note, 2008 / 2
due even as new commitments are entered upon. Cash flows
served as both a source of funds and as the validation of prior
commitments.Thehedge,speculative,andPonzicharacterization
of cash flows may be relevant. [This is a reference to Minsky’s
classification of financial structures. A hedge position is one for
which expected cash flows exceed principal and interest pay-
ments for every period; a speculative position is one for which
near-term cash flows only cover interest, although it is expected
that principal will eventually be paid when cash flows rise at
some future time; a Ponzi position is one in which cash flows do
notcovereventheinterestpayments,hence,interestiscapitalized
as debt grows.]
A banker operates on the basis of expectations of cash flows.
Whatdeterminessuchexpectations?Inparticular,“Howdoexpec-
tations change?”is a fundamental analytical-banking question in
a market-based financial structure. In banking, the collateral
[behind a debt] is of secondary importance—the bank-customer
relation has failed whenever there is a need to capture collateral.
Asset- or collateral-based lending implies that the cash flows to
validate commitments will be forthcoming from the sale of the
asset.Thebuyerobviouslyexpectscashflowsthatwillvalidatethe
price he pays. [Hence, cash flows are expected to come from
incomes or asset sales. These cash flows will—or will not—vali-
date the debts held by banks.]
2. Bank and “funders”
The funders of banks include:
a. households as the ultimate owners; and
b. intermediation and layers of intermediaries [interposed
betweenthebankandtheultimatehouseholdownersof banklia-
bilities]. (The descriptive insights of [John] Gurley and [Edward]
Shaw,on the one hand,and [Raymond] Goldsmith,on the other,
are relevant here.)
A bank deals with both the issuer of debts (held as bank
assets) and the funder (holder of the bank’s liabilities). A bank’s
balancesheetreflectsthistwo-sidednessof banking.Fundincome
depends upon the gap between the cost of money and the return
on earning assets. Bank equity“enhances credits.”Deposit insur-
ance acts as the enhancer of credit for today’s bankrupt banks
and savings and loan associations in the United States. Deposit
insurance is really a government guarantee rather than insurance.
What are the actuarial relations [behind FDIC/FSLIC deposit
insurancepremiums—theydonotreallyreflecttheactualrisksto
the Treasury]? In securitization, the bank’s balance sheet disap-
pears from the financing once the transactions are completed.
Thereisnoquestionof contingentliabilitiesandrecoursesolong
as there is no issue of fraud. [Unless the initiating bank has pro-
vided guarantees for the securities, neither the bank nor the
Treasury is on the hook should the underlying debts—such as
home mortgages—go bad.]
In securitization, the underlying financial instruments [such
as home mortgage loans] and the cash flows they are expected to
generate are the proximate basis for issuing marketable paper.
Income from paper (cash flows) is substituted for the profits
earned by real assets, household incomes, or tax receipts as the
source of the cash flow to support the paper pledges.
The steps and the players
[We can outline the securitization players and process as follows:]
1.Thedebtor: the fundamental paper emitter and source of the
cashflowsfromincome[orassetsales]thatvalidatethesecurities.
2.The paper creator: the bank loan officer who structures the
creditandacceptsthedebtor’spromisestorepay;thenegotiations
between the debtor and the paper creator end up with paper that
can be negotiated. Steps one and two are like conventional bank-
customer relations.
3.Theinvestmentbanker(notethattheinvestmentbankerinter-
faces with many different types of units): finds and negotiates
with the paper creator and buys the paper (bridge financing, the
funding of bridge financing, the relation to commercial banks,
exposure,and“outthewindow”arealltermsthatenterhere).The
paperbecomesthecorpustrust.Onthebasisof theassetsintrust,
theinvestmentbankercreatessecurities,devisingwaystoenhance
credit (insurance, complex of liabilities, ersatz equity in the form
of junk bonds). The investment banker hires “econometricians”
orfinancialeconomiststodemonstratethattherisksof defaulton
interest and principle of some class of the securities it proposes to
issuearesosmallthattheseinstrumentsdeservetohaveaninvest-
ment rating that implies a low interest rate. [As discussed below,
credit-rating agencies work with the paper creator to put together
packages that will receive high ratings; they devise models that
demonstratelowcreditrisktojustifytheratings.Thisisanimpor-
tant credit enhancement.] Securitization is viable—profitable for
all concerned—if the total cash pledged by the securities is less
than the total cash the corpus of the trust is expected to yield.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
4. The trustee: holds the basic paper—the corpus of collateral
for the securities; acts in the interest of the security holders;
receives the cash flows from the underlying instruments and
forwards them to the security holders;and is empowered to end
the trust, sell out the corpus, and transmit proceeds to security
holders according to the hierarchy of rights if the securities rating
falls below some agreed level. [In many cases, the paper creator
agrees to take the securities back onto its own balance sheet if
they cannot be sold at a guaranteed price or if the rating falls
below the agreed level.] If securitization spreads, the trustee
business will boom. There is a need to develop equivalents to
the U.S. trust company if securitization is to be truly global.
5. The servicing organization (often the paper creator; loan
servicing is a source of bank fee income): receives payments
from the corpus and transmits the funds to the trustee.
6. The rating services: place the resulting securities into risk
classes. In the security contract there is a commitment to keep
at least some of the securities in some particular set of low-risk
classes. If the securities fall below some rating, or perhaps are
threatened to fall below some rating, the trustee is supposed to
act to protect the interests of the security holders.This may lead
to the sale of the underlying assets, the corpus of the trust. There
is a danger that the equivalent of making position by selling out
position will result—leading to falling values of the securities.
7.The maker of a secondary market: the initiating investment
banker, often the underwriter. This is usually a dealer market,
not a broker market.This will be a thin market if price and qual-
ity of the securities deteriorate.
8: The funders: households, pension funds, banks with poor
paper-creating facilities, foreign institutions, etc.
Afterword
In this memo, Minsky argued that securitization resulted from
two developments: the globalization of finance and the declin-
ing importance of banks in favor of managed money. The long
depression-free period that followed World War II created
global managed money seeking returns.Packaged securities with
riskweightingsassignedbyrespectedratingagencieswereappeal-
ing for global investors trying to achieve the desired proportion
of dollar-denominated assets.This occurred as the bank share of
all financial assets fell from around 50 percent in the 1950s to
around 25 percent in the 1990s. At the same time, the financial
markets were freer from the New Deal regulations that had made
these markets safer. By the time of the real estate boom in the
United States that eventually led to the subprime crisis,there was
no longer any essential difference between a “commercial bank”
and an “investment bank.” The whole housing sector that had
been made very safe by the New Deal reforms had been trans-
formed into a huge global casino. Minsky argued (1986, p. 45)
that the New Deal reforms related to home finance had been
spurred by a common belief that short-term mortgages,typically
with large balloon payments, had contributed to the Great
Depression; ironically, the “innovations” in home mortgage
finance leading up to the speculative boom—including, most
prominently,securitization—largely re-created those conditions.
Today, we can surmise that the financial innovations of the
past decadegreatly expanded theavailability of credit,whichthen
pushed up asset prices.That,in turn,encouraged not only further
innovation to take advantage of profit opportunities,but also ever
more debt and greater leveraging. The upbeat analyses conducted
throughout the boom relied on modern orthodox finance theory,
incorporated into complex models that appeared to show risk was
being systematically reduced and shifted to those best able to bear
it. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now say that risks were
neither shifted nor reduced. The financial crisis still appears to be
spreading from one market to another, and from one country to
another. We might justifiably wonder whether “it” (another debt
deflation) could happen again. I expect that the combination of
BigGovernmentandBigBank,plustheremainingsafeguardsbuilt
into the system by the New Deal,will prove once again to be suffi-
cient to prevent a recurrence of a great depression. However, the
bigger question is whether analysts and policymakers will learn
from the mistakes of the past couple of decades and begin to for-
mulatepolicythatwillconstrainthenaturalthrusttowardfragility
thatmakesthesecrisesoccurwithgreaterfrequencyandvirulence.6 Policy Note, 2008 / 2
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